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TECHNICAL NOTE TO Forensic Analysis of the ChatSecure Instant Messaging Application on Android Smartphones (see below for citation details)

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TECHNICAL NOTE TO

Forensic Analysis of the ChatSecure Instant Messaging Application on Android Smartphones^{\$\infty\$,\$\display*\$\display\$}

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Abstract

We present the forensic analysis of the artifacts generated on Android smart-phones by *ChatSecure*, a *secure* Instant Messaging application that provides strong encryption for transmitted and locally-stored data to ensure the privacy of its users. In particular, we describe how to concretely configure and use the various tools that we rely upon to create and run an AVD, and to carry out the analysis of its persistent and volatile memory.

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1. Configuring and using the Android Emulator, LiME, and Volatility

In this appendix, we illustrate how to configure and use the software tools used to carry out the analysis methodology used in this work, and in particular the Android Mobile Device Emulator (AMDE) to create and manage Android Virtual Devices (AVD) (1.1), LiME (1.2) to dump the contents of volatile memory, and Volatility (1.3) to analyze these dumps. We focus on the ARM architecture sinceit is the only one that supports the analysis of both persistent and volatile memory. For our experiments, we follow the approach proposed in [9, 10].

1.1. Configuring and using the Android Mobile Device Emulator

In this work we use AVDs in place of a real device to carry out the experiments. Using an AVD entails two distinct steps, namely: (1) the AVD must be created first, and then (2) it must be started by the AMDE, so that the needed apps and services may be installed and used.

All the software tools required to create AVDs, as well as the AMDE, are included in the *Android SDK Tools* [5] and the *Application Binary Interface* (ABI) for ARM EABI v7a System Image software, that we assume are already installed and properly configured on the machine(s) used for the experiments. ¹

To create an AVD on the machine where the emulator runs, the *android* create avd command needs to be used as reported below (character '\$' denotes the shell prompt):

```
\ android create avd -n chatSecureTest -t 'android -21' -b ' default/armeabi-v7a' -c 2G
```

where:

- -n chatSecureTest is the name of the AVD;
- -t 'android-21' is the target ID of the new AVD (the characteristics of this target are showed in Listing 1);
- -b 'default/armeabi-v7a' is the Application Binary Interface;

¹The installation and configuration of these tools is outside the scope of this appendix. Various tutorials explaining how to configure and install Android SDK Tools are available on Android developers web pages [2].

-c 2G is the size of SD card (in this case, it is set to 2 GBytes).

```
Listing 1: Charateristics of 'android-21' target.

id: 5 or 'android -21'
Name: Android 5.0.1
Type: Platform
API level: 21
Revision: 2
Skins: HVGA, QVGA, WQVGA400, WQVGA432, WSVGA,
WVGA800 (default), WVGA854, WXGA720, WXGA800,
WXGA800-7in
Tag/ABIs: no ABIs.
```

Once the AVD has been created, it can be used as a real device by means of the AMDE, that provides a GUI allowing the user to interact with it after having started it by means of the following command:

\$ emulator -avd chatSecureTest &

To run the experiments discussed in this work, we install ChatSecure on the running AVD by means of the following commands:

```
$ wget https://guardianproject.info/releases/chatsecure-
latest.apk
$ adb install chatsecure-latest.apk
```

Furthermore, to extract data generated by ChatSecure from the internal memory of the device, we use the *File Explorer* tool provided by the *Android Device Monitor* [3]. Alternatively, the pull action provided by the Android Debug Bridge can also be used as described below:

\$ adb pull <remote> <local>

where the < remote > and < local > indicate the file/folder to extract, and where to store it on the machine used for the experiments, respectively.

1.2. Configuring and using LiME for volatile memory extraction

The procedure described in the previous section allows the experimenter to extract the data stored in the persistent memory of the device. To extract the contents of volatile memory of an AVD, we resort instead to a different procedure involving LiME, that is arguably the most accurate open-source tool for memory extraction available on Linux systems [7, 6].

LiME consists in a *loadable kernel module* (LKM) that, once loaded into the running kernel, dumps the contents of the volatile memory either on an SD card placed in the device, or over a TCP connection. Therefore, to enable the usage of LiME, the Android kernel running on the AVD must provide loadable modules support.

Unfortunately, the standard AVD kernel (i.e., the default kernel provided with AVDs) does not provide such a support, so to use LiME it is necessary to first configure and compile it (as described in 1.2.1 below), and then to compile LiME as a loadable module for this kernel (as described in 1.2.2 below).

1.2.1. Compiling the Goldfish kernel

To include loadable memory support, the Android kernel (that is named *Goldfish*) must be properly configured and recompiled. To ensure that the recompiled kernel works correctly on the AVD, it is necessary to identify the kernel version running on it, so that the correct source can be used for the recompilation.

The version of the *Goldfish* kernel running on the AVD can be determined by inspecting the contents of the /proc/version special file on the AVD, that can be done as reported below:

```
$ adb shell cat /proc/version
Linux version 3.4.67-01422-gd3ffcc7-dirty (digit@tyrion.par.corp.google.com) (gcc version 4.8 (GCC)) #1 PREEMPT
Tue Sep 16 19:34:06 CEST 2014
```

The kernel version is identified by the so-called *point of development*, that in the example above is gd3ffcc7.

Once this information is known, it is necessary to (a) download the kernel config file from the AVD (this file contains the compilation options for the running kernel), (b) download the toolchain [4] containing the tools required for the compilation, (c) download the source code of the correct kernel version that has been just identified, and (d) add loadable module support to the config file. These steps are reported below, where character '#' denotes a comment:

```
#>>>>> create the test-goldfish folder
$ mkdir -p ~/android/test-goldfish
```

```
$ cd ~/android/test-goldfish
#>>>>> get config.gz file from the emulator and unzip it
$ adb pull /proc/config.gz
$ gunzip config.gz
#>>>>> get the toolchain
$ git clone
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/prebuilts/gcc/
   linux - x86/arm/arm - eabi - 4.7
#>>>>> get the kernel sources and checkout the correct
   commit
$ git clone https://android.googlesource.com/kernel/
   goldfish.git
$ cd ~/android/test-goldfish/goldfish
$ git checkout d3ffcc7
#>>>>> prepare the environment for cross-compilation
$ export ARCH=arm
$ export SUBARCH=arm
$ export
CROSS_COMPILE=~/android/test-goldfish/arm-eabi-4.7/bin/arm-
$ export CoresPlus1=$(($(grep -c processor /proc/cpuinfo))
   +1))
#>>>>> add loadable module support to config
$ make clean && make mrproper
$ cp ../config .config
$ make menuconfig
```

The last statement of the listing above, namely make menuconfig, opens a configuration menu that allows one to select the loadable module support option from a textual menu.

Finally, the re-configured kernel and its modules can be compiled as follows:

```
$ make modules_prepare
# >>>> compile the kernel
$ make -j$CoresPlus1
# >>>> save System.map
$ cp System.map ../System.map
```

and the AVD can be rebooted with the new kernel, that now includes loadable module support, as follows:

1.2.2. Compiling LiME for the Goldfish kernel and using it for memory acquisition

As mentioned before, LiME consists in a kernel module, that needs to be compiled for the kernel running on the AVD as shown below:

```
#>>>>> compile LiME loadable module
$ cd ~/android/test-goldfish/
$ git clone https://github.com/504ensicsLabs/LiME.git
$ cp Makefile.LiME.coss LiME/src/Makefile
$ cd LiME/src
$ make clean && make
$ mv lime.ko lime-goldfish.ko
```

where the *Makefile.LiME.cross* file is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: The Makefile.LiME.cross file.

Once the module has been compiled, it is pushed to the AVD using the ADB, and then it is loaded into the kernel by means of the *insmod* command, as shown below:

```
$ cd ~/android/test-goldfish/
$ adb push lime-goldfish.ko /sdcard/lime.ko
```

```
$ adb forward tcp:4444 tcp:4444
$ adb shell insmod /sdcard/lime.ko "format=lime path=tcp
    :4444" &
$ nc localhost 4444 > goldfish.lime
```

The parameters passed to *insmod* specify that the dump has the LiME's native format, and that the corresponding data are sent across a TCP connection identified by port 4444, that has been forwarded to the same port of the physical machine on which the emulator is running. At the end of the acquisition, the memory dump is stored in the *goldfish.lime* file on the physical machine where the emulator is running.

1.3. Configuring and using Volatility for volatile memory analysis

Volatility [8] is one of the most popular platforms for the analysis of volatile memory, and supports a wide variety of memory dump formats, processor architectures, and operating systems.

To use Volatility of a specific system (characterized by its processor architecture and operating system), it is necessary to create a *volatility profile* storing the information concerning the data structures, the algorithms, and the symbols that have to be used to correctly parse the memory dumps coming from that system.

Creating a Volatility Linux profile means generating a set of VTypes and a System.map file for a particular kernel version and packing those together into one zip file.

VTypes can be extracted from the compiled Linux kernel file vmlinux if available, otherwise with the dwarfdump tool (a tool that parses the debugging information from ELF files, such as Linux kernel and Linux modules).

The *System.map* file can be instead created, for the Android system, by compiling the target kernel as discussed below.

First of all, we need to use a makefile to cross-compile Volatility for the ARM processor architecture, as the one shown in Fig. 2 that we use in our work. Then, we create the profile $Android_Goldfish_3.4.67-01413-gd3ffcc7.zip$ using the commands listed below:

```
# >>>> compile Volatility module
$ cd ~/android/test-goldfish/
$ git clone https://github.com/volatilityfoundation/
    volatility.git
$ cp Makefile.Volatility.cross volatility/tools/linux/
    Makefile
```

Figure 2: The Makefile. Volatility.cross file.

```
$ cd volatility/tools/linux/
$ make
#>>>>> create Volatility profile
$ zip -j Android_Goldfish_3.4.67-01413-gd3ffcc7.zip module.
    dwarf ~/android/test-goldfish/goldfish/System.map
$ cp Android_Goldfish_3.4.67-01413-gd3ffcc7.zip ~/android/
    test-goldfish/goldfish/
$ cp Android_Goldfish_3.4.67-01413-gd3ffcc7.zip ~/android/
    test-goldfish/volatility/plugins/overlays/linux/
```

The last step necessary to run Volatility consists in setting two environment variables called *VOLATILITY_LOCATION* and *VOLATILITY_PROFILE*: the first one has to point to the memory dump file to analyze, while the second one has to point to Volatility profile as follows:

```
$ cd ~/android/test-goldfish/volatility/
$ export VOLATILITY_LOCATION=file://~/android/test-goldfish
   /goldfish.lime
$ export VOLATILITY_PROFILE=LinuxAndroid_Goldfish_3_4_67
   -01413-gd3ffcc7ARM
```

In our work, we use Volatility to search the memory area used by the ChatSecure process for the known passphrase as follows. First, we discovered the *Process ID* (PID) of the ChatSecure process by means of the *linux_psaux* Volatility plugin, that prints the list of active processes, as shown below:

```
$ python vol.py linux_psaux
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.5
         Uid
Pid
                Gid
                        Arguments
1
        0
                0
                        /init
2
                0
                         [kthreadd]
        0
3
        0
                0
                         [ksoftirqd/0]
```

```
... 2876 10060 10060 info.guardianproject.otr.app.im ...
```

From the output of the *linux_psaux* plugin, we see that the PID of ChatSecure is 2876 (the corresponding process is named *info.guardianproject.otr.app.im*).

Then, we can search the memory area associated with the above process by means of the *yarascan* Volatility plugin [1], that is able to scan for pattern or regular expressions anywhere in process or kernel memory. In the example below, we show how *yarascan* can be used to search for the passphrase "thisisthepassword2016" (the one shown in Fig. ??) in the memory space of process with PID=2876:

In the example above, flag -Y indicates the pattern to search for, while flag -p restricts the scan to the memory area of the specific process.

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